Abstract: This paper seeks to provide an improved understanding of the origins of democracy. It begins by developing a theoretical model to demonstrate how exogenous economic conditions can influence both the incentives to establish democratic institutions and the likelihood that such institutions survive. The model predicts that democratic institutions will expand where they mitigate important time-inconsistency problems and, therefore, encourage investment. Exogenous conditions determine the magnitude of those time-inconsistency problems and, hence, the likelihood of democracy. A comparison of ancient Greek city-states suggests that the conditions under which democracy first emerged support the model. Other potential applications are discussed.
I. Introduction
The democratic form of government has fascinated philosophers since the first democracies appeared in ancient Greece about 2500 years ago. (Indeed, Ademocracy@ is a Greek word, meaning rule by the demos, or Apeople.@) Plato, for example, regarded democracy suspiciously, but viewed certain manifestations as preferable to others. Aristotle theorized about the emergence of democracy, tracing its development in a series of steps. Modern democracy differs in many ways from the Greek version, but it fascinates modern scholars to the same degree. Particularly in recent years, economists have become greatly concerned with the question of how different democratic institutions arise, and what underlies their persistence in some cases and failure in others. 1 In order to improve understanding of the origins and persistence of the democratic form of government, this paper develops a theoretical model and applies it to the first democracies: the poleis (city-states) of ancient Greece. The analysis begins from the general premise that timeinconsistency problems create incentives for governments to find ways to constrain their power (e.g., Prescott 1977, 1980) . The model presents a stylized aristocrat deciding whether to extend political rights to an initially disenfranchised demos. Without political rights, the demos will not undertake a wealth-enhancing investment, because the aristocrat cannot commit ex ante to refrain from expropriating the fruits of that investment ex post. Whether this is sufficient to ensure the extension of political rights depends on the size of the loss from underinvestment: Ceteris paribus, the model predicts that the likelihood of adopting democratic institutions is higher when the economic losses resulting from the aristocrat=s time-inconsistency problems are greater.
1 See, for example, North and Weingast (1989) , Kiser and Barzel (1991) , Barzel (1992 Barzel ( , 2000 , North (1993) , Olson (1993) , Weingast (1993 Weingast ( , 1995 Weingast ( , 1997 , Londregan and Poole (1996) , McGuire and Olson (1996) , Barro (1997 Barro ( , 1999 , Robinson (2000, 2001) , Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, forthcoming) , and Minier (2001) . See Lipset (1959) for a seminal contribution to the earlier literature.
To test the model, the paper turns to an analysis of ancient Greece, making use of recent advances in the study of ancient Greek agriculture. 2 In ancient Greece, as in most ancient civilizations, the paramount productive asset was agricultural land. Consistent with the model=s predictions, the paper finds that differences in the extent of democracy between Athens and Sparta, the rise and fall of democracy in Athens over time, and variations in levels of democratic participation between these and other city-states all correspond to exogenous differences in the potential returns to difficult-to-monitor agricultural investment. These exogenous differences in potential returns (brought about by variations in terrain) produced corresponding differences in the value of granting members of the demos secure rights to the agricultural land they worked.
However, for these rights to land to be secure, the property holders had to be given direct influence over public policy; otherwise a time-inconsistency problem with respect to the aristocracy=s incentives would leave the demos= residual claims subject to expropriation. 3 The potential losses from the time-inconsistency problem (i.e., the potential returns to difficult-to-monitor agricultural investment) determined the extent to which an aristocracy would have found it in its interest to cede policy influence to the demos. In short, governments were the most democratic where the value of granting members of the demos secure property rights to agricultural land was greatest.
Before continuing, it is essential to be clear about the word Ademocracy.@ 4 As noted in the opening paragraph, democracy literally means Arule by the people,@ and it is in that sense that the word is used here. As far as this paper is concerned, one regime is more democratic than another to the degree that a larger proportion of its population is able to participate in public decision-making, and thereby influence policy. There are a variety of mechanisms that establish how widely such participation is spread: voting rules, office-holding requirements, the division of responsibilities between governing bodies, and so forth. Classical Athens was more democratic than Classical Sparta because in Athens, native-born males generally had equal political rightsCto vote, to sit on the popular assembly, to hold public officeCand final decisions were made by the broadlyrepresentative popular assembly. By contrast, although Sparta=s political institutions were on the surface very similar to those of Athens, only members of the warrior class were allowed to participate within them. The city-state of Corinth (one of several other city-states examined in this paper) falls between Athens and Sparta, because a much broader spectrum of Corinthian society had the right to political participation (to vote and sit on the popular assembly) than in Sparta, yet the popular assembly=s role was substantially more circumscribed in Corinth than in Athens. Explaining such differences is the objective of this paper. Similar differences are foundCand will be exploredCin the expansion of democracy over time: Athens initially restricted political participation to a warrior class, then expanded participation to include farmers and, eventually, the landless.
This paper thus builds upon and extends the substantial literature on the rational relinquishment of political rights. For example, North and Weingast (1989) , Kiser and Barzel (1991 ), Weingast (1993 , and Barzel (2000) discuss ways in which rulers have voluntarily reduced their power in order to provide the incentive for their subjects to engage in productive activity, while Robinson (2000, 2001) demonstrate how the threat of civil unrest may inspire the wealthy to enfranchise the poor as a means of committing to redistribution from wealthy to poor. In addition, this paper=s findings complement the evidence in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, forthcoming) , who argue that differences in geography have led to differences in institutions (most notably through the choices of European colonizers), which in turn have influenced economic outcomes.
5
The paper also has important implications for the debate over whether democracy causes economic growth and/or economic growth causes democracy (e.g., Barro 1997 Barro , 1999 . The model developed here illustrates a mechanism by which democratic reforms may indeed lead to increases in wealth. However, the root cause of the increased wealth is not democracy per se. Rather, both wealth and democracy depend on a third factor: the nature of the important productive assets in that society.
6

II. Theoretical Model
The purpose of the theoretical model is to illustrate how exogenous economic factors can influence whether or not democratic institutions will arise to replace non-democratic institutions. To keep the analysis tractable, the model considers a country with two representative actors: an aristocrat and a demos. The aristocrat provides a stylized representation of the monarch, emperor, nobility, and/or other members of a ruling class. The demos provides a stylized representation of the non-aristocratic population, such as peasants, or more generally those who are, at least initially, disenfranchised. To maximize the present value of a benefit stream, the aristocrat seeks to avoid 5 For a diverse set of additional examples from the large recent literature on institutions and credible commitment, see North (1990) , Greif (1993 Greif ( , 1994 , Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) , Levy and Spiller (1994) , Anderson (1995) , Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1996) , Keefer (1997a, 1997b) , Fleck (2000) , Wittman (2000) , and Hanssen (2002) . 6 For additional examples from the large recent literature on the relationship between democracy and economic performance, see Alesina and Drazen (1991) , Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Rodrik (1999) , and Mueller and Stratmann (2001). conquest by foreign invaders. The demos seeks to maximize its expected net income.
The aristocrat=s key decision is whether to retain control of tax rates. If the aristocrat retains control, the aristocrat chooses the level of taxes imposed on the demos. The tax rate can be no higher than that which leaves the demos at a reservation wage. The alternative to retaining control of tax rates is for the aristocrat to establish a system in which the demos chooses the level of taxes to collect from itself, i.e., to establish a Ademocracy.@ Once a democratic system is established, the aristocrat cannot reassume control of tax rates. Under either system, the tax revenue is used entirely for defense against foreign attack. The advantage of the democratic system is that it avoids a potential time-inconsistency problem that arises because of differences between the aristocrat=s ex ante and ex post incentives when setting tax rates on income from investments made by the demos.
The disadvantage of the democratic system, from the aristocrat=s perspective, is that the demos values its own consumption when setting tax rates.
Assumptions
A1
Decisions in the initial period. First, the aristocrat chooses either to retain control of tax rates or to relinquish control permanently by allowing the demos to set tax rates. Second, the demos decides whether to make an investment to increase its output in future periods. The aristocrat cannot observe whether the demos makes the investment.
A2
Order of events in subsequent periods. Five events occur in the following order: (i) The demos= potential output becomes public knowledge.
(ii) The tax rate on the demos= income is set (by either the aristocrat or the demos, depending upon the initial period decision). (iii) The demos chooses whether to realize the potential output or end the relationship with the aristocrat (e.g., quit or flee). (iv) The tax on the demos= output is collected and used for defense. (v) Foreigners may attack and conquer the country.
A3
The aristocrat seeks to avoid conquest. The aristocrat maximizes the expected present value of avoiding conquest, with m the per period value of avoiding conquest and µ the discount rate. If foreigners conquer the country, the aristocrat no longer receives m.
A4
The demos maximizes the expected value of its net income. The demos uses a discount rate ρ to value a net income stream {I t } that extends infinitely into the future. The demos= relationship with the aristocrat yields I t equal to the value of output, less the cost of investment, and less taxes. The demos makes the investment if doing so maximizes the expected value of {I t }. The demos ends the relationship with the aristocrat if (i) doing so would increase the expected value of {I t } or (ii) foreigners conquer the country. If the demos ends the relationship with the aristocrat, the demos will have I t = w from that period forward (i.e., the demos earns a reservation wage w).
A5
Output depends on investment. With no investment, the demos= relationship with the aristocrat generates output r per period. By incurring a cost c in the initial period, the demos can make an investment that increases output to r + i for future periods.
A6
The probability of foreigners conquering the country depends on defense spending. For the relevant range of spending, the probability in any given period is inversely proportional to defense spending in that period. Let g t $0 represent defense spending and δ t represent the probability of being conquered. With γ>0: δ t = γg t -1 for γg t -1 # 1; δ t = 1 for γg t -1 > 1. In each period, defense spending equals tax revenue.
A7
Exogenous factors. The following are exogenous, greater than zero, and invariant over time: m, µ, ρ, w, r, c, i, γ.
A8
Actors are rational. The aristocrat and demos act rationally and have full information about the values of the exogenous variables and about the other actor=s objectives.
Solution
As a preliminary step, consider the actors= objective functions. Following Assumption A4, at t=0 the demos seeks to maximize:
Following Assumption A3, at t=0 the aristocrat seeks to maximize 8 :
The model can be solved by comparing the expected returns to the actors under alternative sets of strategies. Because the actors are rational, they look forward to determine the consequences of 7 Note that the demos= investment is specific to the relationship with the aristocrat because the investment does not affect w. their decisions. In this light, it is useful to calculate EU A and EU D under four scenarios, classified by whether the aristocrat retains control of tax rates and whether the demos makes the investment.
Case i: demos does not make investment; aristocrat sets tax rates To solve for the aristocrat=s choice of tax rates, first note that the inter-temporal invariance of the exogenous variables implies that the aristocrat will set tax rates that do not vary over time. With no investment made, the demos will remain in the relationship in period t if and only if w # r -g t .
Hence, to maximize EU A , the aristocrat sets g t = r -w in each period. This yields I t = w, leaving the demos receiving the reservation wage. Solving for the actors= levels of expected utility:
Case ii: demos makes investment; aristocrat sets tax rates
With the investment made, the demos will remain in the relationship if and only if w # r + i -g t .
Following logic similar to that in Case i, the aristocrat sets g t = r + i -w in each period. Hence, after the investment cost c is sunk in the initial period, the aristocrat will set the tax rate to leave the demos at the reservation wage. Solving for the actors= levels of expected utility:
Case iii: demos does not make investment; demos sets tax rates
The demos will set the tax rate that maximizes EU D . Due to the inter-temporal invariance in the exogenous variables and, hence, the solution, if g t=j = g* is the optimal choice for t=j, then g t = g* is the optimal choice regardless of t. Hence, g* can be found by solving for the value of g that maximizes the sum of expected future net income over years before and after conquest 10 :
which can be rewritten:
The first order condition for g* is MEU D /Mg = 0. From the equation above:
Solving the first order condition yields:
This yields the actors= levels of expected utility:
Case iv: demos makes investment; demos sets tax rates Following the same method used for Case iii, g* can be found by solving for the value of g that maximizes:
Possible outcomes
Comparing the four cases shows that Cases ii and iii would never occur. 11 The key question thus becomes whether Case i or Case iv will be the outcome. In some circumstances (e.g., if c is sufficiently high relative to i or if γ is sufficiently high), the demos would be unwilling to make the investment even if it controlled tax rates; under these conditions, the aristocrat would retain control of tax rates and Case i would be the outcome. 12 The more interesting situation, however, occurs when c is sufficiently low that establishing democratic control of tax rates would induce the demos to make the investment. The aristocrat will establish democratic control of tax rates if defense spending under Case iv (democratic control) exceeds defense spending under Case i (aristocratic control):
11
First, comparing EU D between Case i and Case ii shows that the demos will not make the investment when the aristocrat sets tax rates; this rules out Case ii. Second, comparing EU A between Case i and Case iii shows that the aristocrat prefers Case i. Thus, if democratic control of tax rates failed to induce the demos to invest, the aristocrat would retain control of tax rates; this rules out Case iii.
It is worth noting that, under the model=s assumptions, time-inconsistency problems would preclude Case ii even if side payments could be incorporated. If, in an effort to fund investment in period t, the aristocrat compensated the demos before the aristocrat observed the potential output value, the demos would still not make the investment, because it would obtain w (from the aristocrat or elsewhere) in the future regardless of whether the investment was made. If the aristocrat promised to compensate the demos after the aristocrat observed the potential output, the investment would again not be made, because the demos would rationally expect the aristocrat to renege on that promise. 12 More precisely, to determine whether the demos will make the investment, compare EU D between Case iii and Case iv. This shows that when the demos controls tax rates, it will make the investment if and only if c is sufficiently low that:
where:
equivalently:
The next question is how the exogenous variables affect (g d -g a ) for interior solutions.
Differentiating (g d -g a ) yields four findings (proof available from the authors):
The model therefore predicts, ceteris paribus: P1 A greater likelihood of democratic institutions where, in the absence of difficult-to-monitor specific investments, output is low (low r).
P2
A greater likelihood of democratic institutions where difficult-to-monitor specific investments yield a large increase in output (high i).
P3
A greater likelihood of democratic institutions where the demos has a high reservation wage (high w).
P4
A greater likelihood of democratic institutions where, in the absence of substantial spending on national defense, a demos that makes specific investments has a substantial probability of losing those investments to foreign conquest (high γ).
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Thus, low r, high i, high w, and high γ are democracy-promoting factors. Before proceeding to apply the model to ancient Greece, there are two points on which it is important to be clear. First, these factors work not only through their influence on an aristocrat=s incentives, but through their influence on the expected duration of a democratic regime relative to that of a non-democratic 13 However, recall that if γ is too high, the demos will choose not to make the investment even if it controls tax rates. Hence, an extremely high γ (e.g., imminent invasion) is not democracy-promoting.
regime.
14 Second, the model=s predictions differ from the notion of Aincome causing democracy@ or
Ademocracy causing income@Cin the context of the model, income may be either positively or negatively related to the adoption democracy.
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III. Applying the Model to Ancient Greece
Greece is not a flat territory of wide-open expanses, with regular precipitation, plentiful rivers, and ubiquitous lakes. Yet it is not a poor country either. The soil is rocky but rich, the harnessing of water possible but only through ingenuity and toil. The growing season is long, predictable, and dry...Winters are cold, not harsh, and so provide critical dormancy for trees and vines...True, mountains and hills predominate, but slopes are more often gentle than jagged, and can shelter as well as isolate villages. (Hanson 1999, 26) That the city-states of ancient Greece developed in a manner very different from the rest of the ancient world has always been obvious (for a review of the political institutions of Athens and Sparta, see Appendix B). The explanations offered frequently turn upon the unique attributes of the 14 Although the implications derived in the text pertain to a single aristocrat whose only concern is avoiding conquest, the model can easily be extended to allow for a succession of heterogeneous aristocrats. This extension to a stochastic framework has two key implications for understanding the model=s practical application. First, the effects of r, i, w, and γ on aristocrats= incentives (as derived above) all correspond to the effects of those variables on the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in a stochastic framework. Second, regime-survival effects arising from the likelihood of conquest complement the incentive effects: Under the same conditions that create incentives for aristocrats to adopt democracy, democratic regimes will tend to outlast non-democratic regimes. For a formal extension of the model to a stochastic framework, see Appendix A.
The model yields some other implications that, while testable in principle, would be difficult to test in practice. First, a lower value of ρ (the demos= discount rate) is democracy-promoting. Second, in the stochastic framework developed in Appendix A, a lower value of m a (the aristocrat=s benefit, other than tax revenue effects, from retaining control of tax rates) is democracy-promoting. In principle, a proxy for m a might be found in the nature of aristocratic perks lost under democracy and/or other dimensions of policy changed by democracy (e.g., redistribution away from the aristocracy). 15 In the model, countries will tend to adopt democracy when doing so will increase their income. Yet it is easy to show that higher income may be positively or negatively related to the adoption of democracy. For example, increases in r and i both increase potential income, yet an increase in r decreases the likelihood of democracy while an increase in i increases the likelihood of democracy. Similarly, increasing r and w by equal amounts increases the wealth of demos but has no effect on likelihood of democracy, while increasing both r and w, with a greater increase in r, yields a wealthier aristocrat and a wealthier demos, yet reduces likelihood of democracy. Finally, increasing both r and w, with a smaller increase in r, yields a wealthier demos and an increased likelihood of democracy.
Greek terrain: The mountainous and isolating landscape promoted independence, the scattered and rocky agricultural land rewarded ingenuity, and the independent and ingenious Greeks forged a new, democratic system of government.
16 Even Plato linked Greek government to landscape, suggesting that hilly countryside provided the ideal conditions for the polis to develop (Leg. 4.704E-705B).
The analysis that follows also emphasizes the importance of the Greek terrain, but it takes the old argument much further by using terrain to explain variations in democratic development within
Greece. 17 The historical 16 See Michell (1957, 2-9) for a typical account. 17 There is no generally accepted explanation, nor even much theory offered, as to why some Greek city-states became more democratic than others. Most classical scholars have instead focused on identifying, documenting, and interpreting the historical and institutional details behind the emergence of political systems in particular city-states, especially Athens (e.g., Manville 1990; Hansen 1991; Ober 1989 Ober , 1996 . 18 The reader will note that for evidence this paper relies principally on historical discussion (citing both ancient and modern scholarship) rather than on statistical analysis. The simple reason is that very few statistics are available for ancient Greece (though see table 1). The Greek city-states kept few records of quantities or prices of agricultural (and other) produce, and even fewer survived.
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19 Although explaining why ancient Greece as a whole was anomalously democratic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the reservation wage (w) may have been a democracy-promoting factor throughout Greece. Because of Tiebout (1956) competition, the typical member of the Greek demos would have had a higher reservation wage than would most subject peoples elsewhere of the time. There were many independent Greek city-states (in large part due to the Aisolating@ terrain) to which an unhappy Greek could emigrate. All of the city-states shared a common language and culture and were in close The Classical Period: Why Athens was More Democratic than Sparta
20
In Classical Athens, enfranchised farmers worked the fields and made up the majority of the citizenry, while in Classical Sparta, those who worked the fields were disenfranchised serfs. Athens thus had a far larger proportion of its population participating in public decisionsCin Athens, the demos set policy, while in Sparta, the aristocracy did. The following discussion explains Athenian democracy as the response to the low r and high i resulting from the nature of Athenian terrain.
Different terrain: In Spartan plains, high r and low i; on Athenian hillsides, low r and high i
In the model, r is the output that results when the demos does not undertake the unobservable investment. In Sparta, the nature of agricultural terrain was such that high levels of output could be achieved without difficult-to-monitor specific investments. The crucial difference between Sparta and most Greek city-states is that Sparta controlled the rich plains of Laconia and Messenia, which supported large-scale grain production. 21 Grain was a staple in Classical Greece (Pomeroy, et al. 1999, 3-4) , and grain-producing land was a key productive asset. Unlike many of the geographic proximity, which reduced the cost of relocation, hence raising the reservation wage. Greeks did indeed migrate. The larger city-states (Athens for example) had substantial populations of foreign residents (metics), many of whom were from other Greek city-states (Aristotle was a metic). Furthermore, the establishment of colonies increased the number of potential destinations. New colonies even recruited immigrants from other city-states. For example, Freeman (1950, 25) reports that the Athenian colony of Thourioi issued a proclamation Ato the cities of the Peloponnese, offering a place to anyone who wished to join. Many accepted.@ This fits Barzel=s (2000) argument that rulers may, as a mechanism to commit credibly to refrain from confiscating wealth, allow their subjects to live near borders where escape is easier.
contemporaneous civilizations of the Near East (such as Egypt and Persia), most parts of Greece were hilly and rocky; however, Sparta was an exception (Hanson 1999) . Growing wheat in the Spartan-controlled valleys required little in the way of specific investments (in irrigation or anything else): Plowing was simple, the growing cycle was short, and the land was homogeneous. In the context of the model, the nature of the Spartan terrain ensured that r, the level of output in the absence of unobservable specific investment, was large, and i, the additional output that would have been generated by costly-to-observe specific investment, was small.
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By contrast, Athens lacked large, homogeneous tracts of land suitable for grain production.
23
The terrain of Attica, the site of Athens, consisted of small valleys, hills, and coastline, and was generally dry and rocky. Much of this heterogeneous landscape could be cultivated only if terraced, and was correspondingly difficult to plow. Thus, in the context of the model, r was much smaller in Athens than in Sparta. In the model, the response to a low r is democracy if i (the additional output generated by the demos= investment) is sufficiently high. In Athens, i was indeed high, because the same physical attributes that made the land unsuitable for large-scale grain cultivation rendered it attractive for investment in olive trees (more detail on the nature of that investment below). In his discussion of Greek agriculture, Hanson (1999, 76) emphasizes that olives can Agrow on barren soil where little else is viable@Cthis describes much of the Athenian terrain. Although most Athenians 22 The homogeneity of Spartan lands is indicated by the state=s ideological goal (seldom followed in practice) of supplying citizens with equal-sized estates, each of which was supposed to produce an equal amount of output. See Plutarch (Lyc. 8.7) and Jameson (1992, 136) . The fact that each Spartan estate was supposed to (but did not often in fact) revert to the state for reassignment after the owner=s death also indicates relatively little concern with incentives for long-term investment. See Murray (1993, 175) , Hodkinson (2000) , and Jameson (1992) . 23 What fertile plains Athens had were much smaller than those controlled by Sparta. Consistently, recent estimates suggest that as much as half of the grain consumed by Athens during the Classical period was imported, primarily from the region of the Black Sea (Whitby 1998) . For alternative estimates, see Garnsey (1988) . The grain that Athens did grow was primarily barley, considered less tasty, but hardier and able to grew cereals as well, the land of Attica was simply better suited to olives. Indeed, Athens= founding myth has the city pledging its allegiance to Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, because Athenians preferred her gift of an olive tree to the competing gift (a salty spring) from Poseidon.
With low r and high i, Athens had more to gain from granting residual claims to agricultural workers Typically, establishing secure title to an asset is necessary to induce users of the asset to make efficient decisions with respect to long-term investments. Two very different agricultural regimes existed in ancient Greece: (i) large estates farmed by serfs and engaged nearly exclusively in the large-scale production of cereals and (ii) smaller properties worked by the owners of the land (with their families and retainers), usually producing the famous Greek triad of olives, vines, and cereals (Jameson 1992) . Sparta was representative of the former, and Athens of the latter.
The food consumed by Spartans was produced by serfs, known as helots, on distant estates owned by Spartans (Hodkinson 2000 , Forrest 1969 . 24 Helots were required to provide half the production of the estates to the absent Spartan masters, who devoted themselves to full-time military training. Helots differed from chattel slaves in that they possessed the right to live on the land they farmed, to maintain a family, and to own some personal items. 25 However, they had no land ownership rights, and no freedom of movement.
By contrast, Athenians in the Classical period typically owned the land they worked. Athenian survive in drier, less fertile soil (Freeman 1999, 40) .
24
Most estates were indeed distant. Sparta was located about 50 miles from its Messenian plains, with Mount Taygetos between them. Forrest (1969, 14) writes, ATwo distinct units, then, Laconia and Messenia, and communications between them were far from easy.@ farmers, known as georgoi, had formal title to their land (which could be sold or leased within the citizen community) and full claim to its produce. The plots owned by the georgoi were usually small, less than half the size of the average Spartan estate. 26 Most of these plots were located some distance from the major towns, on terraced hillsides, where the farmers grew olives, vines, and
barley. Yet the georgoi were not subsistence peasants; many owned one or two slaves, whom the landowners worked alongside and closely supervised.
27
What explains this difference in ownership regimes? In other words, why did the Athenian aristocracy not retain control of the land and simply order peasants on rocky hillsides to grow crops, as the Spartan aristocracy did with its wheat-growing serfs? 28 The answer has to do with efficiency considerations. Economic theory shows that losses from principal-agent problems are greatest when the agent=s level of effort is only weakly correlated with observable signals, such as output. In such cases, efficiency is enhanced by assigning ownership to the agent. This was the case with olives in Athens.
Olive production differs from the production of annual crops, such as wheat, in that olive trees bear fruit only after a large, difficult-to-monitor investment of time and effort. High yields require years of labor from workers skilled in grafting, irrigating, pruning, and suckering. A newly planted tree requires 20-60 years to mature (although it can begin to produce fruit after ten years), and even 26 Athenian farms were typically 10-20 acres large. Not until the Hellenistic period following Philip of Macedon=s conquest of Greece did plots larger than 100 acres become common (Hanson 1999, 192) . 27 Hired agricultural labor was rare. Although there was no social disdain associated with working one=s own land, employing oneself to work another=s land was despised. In The Odyssey, when one of Penelope=s suitors offers Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, a job on his estate, he is actually proffering a deadly insult. Odysseus reacts angrily, challenging the man to a threshing contest (which itself indicates that working one=s own land was perfectly acceptable). 28 All of ancient Greece, including pre-Classical Athens, once employed agricultural serfs. The paper discusses below why Athens abandoned the use of serfs. new shoots grafted to mature trees (the common practice) take six or seven years to bear fruit (Hanson 1983, 55) . Whether these investments are being correctly made is very difficult to monitor.
The output of a given olive tree depends largely upon the characteristics of the particular plot (degree of slope, soil quality, intensity of sun, access to water). Because of the heterogeneity of the land, plots differed in these respects across peasants (the peasants were scattered across hillsides, where cultivable and non-cultivable areas were interspersed). Thus, in contrast to his Spartan counterpart, who oversaw simple activities involving homogenous land that generated a consistent level of output, a distant Athenian landlord (if one existed) could not simply have compared levels of olive production (or production of other crops, for that matter) across peasants for evidence of shirking (e.g., Barzel 1989; Allen and Lueck 1998) . 29 This problem was exacerbated by the long gestation period of olive treesCeven if shirking could be discerned from observing output, output itself required 10-20 years of investment to reach a stable level. By contrast, the growing cycle in the Spartan wheat fields was a single season.
Because of the difficulty in monitoring investment, and the consequent larger losses associated with a principal-agent setting, the assignment of residual claims to the peasant actually working the land was the more efficient solution for olive production. Even today, farmers of orchards, vineyards, and other perennial crops are much more likely to own the land they farm than are farmers of annual crops, such as wheat. 30 And consistent with the predictions of economic theory, 29 For simplicity, the theoretical model assumes that the aristocrat cannot directly observe whether the demos makes the investment. However, for the model to apply to ancient Greece, monitoring need not have been impossible, but merely sufficiently costly that the aristocracy preferred to grant property rights.
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30 Milgrom and Roberts (1992, 308-10 ) discuss this in their section titled, APredicting Asset Ownership.@ They write, A [An] example is the use of farm land for annual crops such as wheat. The investments made by the farmer in any one particular growing season, such as preparing the soil, planting, fertilizing, and so on are highly specific, but the transaction itself is simple. . . . Therefore, a relatively simple contract that transfers the rights to use the land for farming to a renter for a particular season is a good Jameson (1992, 137) observes of the ancient world, Athe serf system worked well only on large estates of the best land@Ci.e., the land on which cereals were grown.
Thus, the differences in landownership between Sparta and Athens corresponded to differences in the nature of the terrain. Sparta=s homogeneous, fertile valleys, with high r and low i, were suited to the easily-monitored cultivation of cereals by serfs, who provided the distant Spartan landowners with a share of the output. 31 The heterogeneous, hilly, and rocky terrain of Attica, with low r and high i, was more suitable for the cultivation of olive trees, a long-term, specific, and difficult-tomonitor investment, which made it instead optimal to assign ownership of the land, and thus residual claims to income from the land, to those who worked it.
32
Because the efficient assignment of residual claims differed, so did political rights
An aristocracy in ancient Athens could not establish secure property rights merely by promising to respect peasants= claims to the land and to the olives they grew on it. In order to give agricultural peasants the incentive to work for 10-20 years in a manner largely unobservable to the aristocracy on substitute for having the farmer own the land . . . The situation with fruit orchards, vineyards, and other perennial crops is very different. There, the farmer=s investment is expected to last for a long period of time, during which complicated decisions about crops, soil, and other uses of the land may have to be made. Spelling out all these contingencies in a long-term contract would be impossible. . . . We expect to find that farmers of these kinds of crops are much more likely to own the land they farm than are farmers of annual crops. Evidence from the state of California is consistent with this distinction.@ Also see Bottomley (1963) , who describes how Libyans planted almond trees only on private land, while using common land for cereal cultivation and nomadic grazing, and Anderson (1995) , who examines the relationship between investment and property rights among Native American tribes.
an investment that would generate an essentially perpetual stream of income, the aristocracy had to commit credibly to refrain from subsequent expropriation. 33 Because there were no independent third-party enforcers (independent courts, for example), the aristocracy could commit itself only by constraining its own power, so as to reduce its ability to reallocate (to itself) the residual claims to future income from these investments. In other words, credible commitment to property rights for agricultural peasants required transferring to those peasants influence over policy decisions that would subsequently affect their residual claims. In short, secure ownership of land (and of the rents from it) required that landowners be able to influence policy. Indeed, throughout the ancient world, the link between political rights and secure claims to land was ubiquitous; one typically did not exist without the other.
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Thus, for Athenian farmers to hold secure property rights, they had to be able to influence policy.
And, consistent with the model=s predictions, farmers had much greater influence over policy in Athens (where they grew olives on heterogeneous land) than in Sparta (where they grew wheat on homogeneous land). Each of the two city-states had a popular assembly that passed laws and a council that prepared motions for the assembly (see Appendix B for details). But while Athenian farmers had the right to sit on the popular assembly and council and to hold all public offices, Sparta restricted membership in the assembly to the warrior class and council membership and other public 33 Once established (i.e., after the large investment), olive trees can produce olives for centuries (Forbes and Foxhall 1978) .
As a general rule, of course, democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for secure property rights; for example, slaves have sometimes had rights to property (Barzel 1989) , and democracy may allow the majority to expropriate wealth from a minority. However, as Weber (1976, 174) notes, in most ancient civilizations, AOwnership of land alone determined a man=s political status.@ Control of land was the route to political power, and political power secured the control of land. As Gernet (1981, 314) writes of the ancient world, AIt should always be remembered that, in principle, laws governing land ownership exist only for citizens.@ offices further still. 35 In effect, Sparta=s political structure never evolved much beyond the warrior=s assembly that had been common throughout Greece during the Dark Ages, so that a population of no more than 10,000 enfranchised full-time warriors governed a native-born male population of roughly 100,000 disenfranchised agricultural serfs. 36 By contrast, Athenian men who worked the land had the same political rights as other male citizens.
In sum, because of differences in i and r (the result of differences in terrain), Athens had the economic incentive to provide secure property rights to a larger group of people than did Sparta.
This required enfranchising a broader segment of Athenian society than of Spartan society. Athens was more democratic than Sparta as a result.
The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Athens
In the model, a sufficient exogenous increase in the return to specific investment, i, will convert a non-democratic, non-investing regime to a democratic, investing regime. What follows will 35 Solon, who became Athenian archon (leader) in 594 B.C., is credited with altering the Athenian political system from one based primarily on status at birth to one based on wealth, thus enfranchising much of the agrarian sector (Ober 1989, 64) . Because of Solon=s reforms, AAn elite of wealth, which would be larger and more permeable to new members, replaced the nobility of birth as the exclusive governing elite@ (Ober 1989, 61) . Over the following centuries, further reforms expanded democratic rights, eventually enfranchising the landless as well (see Appendix B). This fits the change in the key productive assets in Athens. By the time the link between land and political rights was eliminated, the creation of wealth in Athens depended on a variety of industries, including manufacturing, mining, and trade. Granting political rights to those engaged in those industries, regardless of whether they owned land, helped secure the rights to the returns from investment in those industries. See Ober (1989) , Hansen (1991) .
The major Spartan political institutions consisted of (i) a dual kingship (perhaps a legacy of the uniting of independent villages); (ii) a council known as the Gerousia, whose members had to be over the age of 60 and served for life (no bill could be brought to the assembly until it had first been discussed and approved by the Gerousia, and the Gerousia had, as did the kings, the power to overrule assembly decisions); and (iii) a popular assembly, possessed of the power to pass laws. Although the Gerousia=s members were elected by the popular assembly, in which all Spartan citizens could participate, they were probably chosen only from certain aristocratic families. Appendix B discusses Spartan political institutions in more detail; see also Forrest (1968) , Hodkinson (2000) .
demonstrate that democracy, property rights to smallholdings of land, and investment in olive production rose and fell together in Athens. From a relatively undemocratic starting point at the end of the Dark Ages, when the use of serfs was common across all of Greece, Athenian political institutions became increasingly democratic, property rights to smallholdings increasingly welldefined, and investment in olive production increasingly important. 37 This occurred because two factors caused i to increase: the settlement of vacant land driven by population growth, and a change in olive production technology. Athenian political institutions remained democratic until invasion by a foreign empire in the 4 th century B.C. ended democracy, which led to the abandonment of marginal lands, substantial concentration in landholdings, and the collapse of olive production.
The settlement of vacant land and the change in land tenure
The transition from a serf-type system to citizen-farmers in Athens accompanied a transformation of agricultural production that began during the massive settlement of previously vacant land at the start of the Archaic period in the 9 th and 8 th centuries B.C. This settlement was driven by rapid population growth, which may have reached rates of two to three percent per year.
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The expanding population spread from the high r fertile valleys to terrain called eschatia (marginal land). The typical eschatia had been vacant hillsides, perhaps used sporadically for grazing.
The mere fact that this land had been vacant suggests that investment was required to render it productive. Indeed, eschatia was the heterogeneous and hilly terrain that supported olive 37 On serfs in pre-Classical Greece, see Jameson (1992) and Finley (1982) .
See Pomeroy, et al. (1999, 43) . Throughout Greece, precipitous declines in population had followed the collapse of Mycenaean civilization circa 1150 B.C. (estimated at 60 to 90 percent, depending on the region), leaving much land vacant. Then, at the end of the 9 th century (the end of the Dark Ages), the population began to grow again, reaching rates of two to three percent per year by the early 8 th century. See Hanson (1999, 36) and the citations therein. production, and therefore required the specific investments described earlier. 39 As explained above, creating proper incentives for such investment required those who worked the land to have secure claims to the output. Thus, with the settlement of the eschatia came a fundamental change in Athenian land tenure: the rise to dominance of the kleros, the family owned and operated farm (Hanson 1999) . The kleros was not a strictly private holding in the sense we understand it todayCit was attached to the oikos (Afamily@) rather than to the individual. 40 Nonetheless, it represented a claim to the land in perpetuity. Previously, the Mycenaean overlords and the Dark-Age chieftains had Aowned@ tracts of land and controlled the produce of that land, but in the Archaic Period there first appeared a group of Greek farmers who were neither serfs, wealthy aristocrats, nor subsistence peasants (e.g., Hanson 1999, 87) . 41 These farmers eventually became the majority of the Athenian citizenry.
Investment in olive cultivation
The rise to dominance of enfranchised citizen-farmers in Athens occurred jointly with an 39 Although eschatia literally means Amarginal land,@ Hanson (1999, 79) suggests that it connotes Aacreage on more difficult terrain, open for any with capital and a desire for difficult labor.@ Hanson (1999, 80) continues, ABy the 5 th century we should imagine that in almost every area of Greece terraces and land reclamation were ongoing. This involved an enormous investment of time, capital, and effort in order to cultivate hillsides that were formerly only marginally valuable as pasture.@ In Sparta, relative abundance of open plains meant that there was less pressure to settle the eschatia. As Hanson (1999, 85) explains, AIt was one of the great ironies of Greek history that the rich substantial plains of Thessaly, Macedonia, Messenia [the home of Sparta=s Messenian helots], and Crete probably fostered agricultural stagnation...due to the absence of large tracts of unwanted, unowned, eschatia.@ 40 An oikos sometimes included slaves, or even an entire clan (Donlan 1989, 134-6) . 41 Morris (2001) suggests that population growth increased the monitoring costs of a sharecropping system, thereby providing the incentive to assign residual claims to agricultural workers in the valleys as well on the hillsides. increase in output from specific investments in olive production. This has two important links to the theoretical model. First, a change in olive production technology increased i, the additional output obtained from investment in olive trees. Until relatively recently, the prevalent view among Classical scholars had been that olives, vines, and fruit trees were always important parts of Greek agricultural production. A new consensus has emerged: Until the 8 th century B.C., the varieties of olives, grapes, and even cereals cultivated in Greece were mostly feral (Hanson 1999, 33-5) .
Consistently, there is no evidence that Greeks had the skills necessary for grafting and budding before the 8 th century (Hanson 1999, 78) . Pollen studies date the importation of improved varieties of olives and grapes from Asia Minor to the early Archaic period (Boardman 1977) . These improved trees and vines greatly increased the potential output of the newly-cultivated kleros located on eschatia: They grew well on rocky hillsides, where plowing and grain production were extremely difficult, and they could thrive with less moisture and less nitrogen. Hence, the new technology increased i, which the model predicts will increase the likelihood of democracy.
Second, there is evidence that democracy increased investment in olive production. For example, scholars have suggested that Solon=s famous democratic reforms of the early 6 th century (see Appendix B) led to a boom in Athens= export of olive oil (Freeman 1999, 106) . This fits the model=s characterization of democracy as a mechanism to address time-inconsistency problems. As explained earlier, because highly productive olive trees required difficult-to-monitor care and many years to mature, one would expect olive production to flourish when organized such that the trees were cared for by individuals who had secure rights to the trees= future output. This type of organization appears to have arisen with the establishment of family-operated farms owned by enfranchised citizens.
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After the invasion: Loss of political rights and abandonment of land and olives
The political institutions that characterized the Classical period were put to an end by the conquests of Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great. Although Athens and other Greek cities continued to exist, their nature changed fundamentally. As Runciman (1990, 348) explains,
AThe poleis that survived and indeed flourished in the Hellenistic and even the Roman periods were poleis in name only: they were urban communities with a life of their own, but not citizen-states in the sociological sense.@ Consistent with the model, the decline of democracy (forced by a foreign invasion) caused a striking reversal of the economic changes that had accompanied the rise of democracy. Deprived of political rights, Athenian farmers abandoned land, leaving much of the surrounding countryside vacant, especially the hilly eschatia that had successfully supported olive production (Hanson 1999, 390) . 44 Much of the land that continued to be cultivated coalesced into large blocks under the control of single individuals. 45 Monoculture, with a focus on cereals, replaced the diverse mixture of 43 Thucydides associated the pre-polis Greeks= inability to settle in one place with their reluctance to plant olive trees (1.2.2.). Interestingly, Athenian rulers quite probably considered underinvestment in olive trees an important policy issue. For example, the 6 th century Athenian tyrant Peisistratus provided loans for the planting of trees and vines (Aristotle Ath. Pol. 16.3) . In addition, tradition has it that, under Athens= early kings, the government paid a bonus to those planting olive trees. During the Classical period, cutting down someone else=s tree was forbidden under grave penalty, and cutting down one=s own trees was restricted to two per year, unless for a usage authorized by the gods (Beaujour 1800, 174) . 44 Although olive trees are nearly indestructible, they quickly return to the feral state if not welltended. The difference is significant: one olive from a domesticated tree may produce as much oil as ten olives from a feral tree. See, e.g., Beaujour (1800, 176) and Forbes and Foxhall (1978, 38) . 45 During the 4 th and 5 th centuries, Greek farms of more than 100 acres were highly unusual, but during the 3 rd and 2 nd centuries, large estates became the norm. Disparities in landholding had been small during the Classical period, when the wealthiest of the Athenian landowners might have had 4-5 times the land of the average farmer. During the Hellenistic period, some estates were a thousand times larger than the average small farms. See the examples cited in Hanson (1999, 389) . cereals, olives, and vines. Freeman (1999, 119) writes, AThe disruptions of the early Hellenistic period...led to the collapse of the olive industry...and a retreat by farmers to the more fertile grainbearing areas.@ And, as Hanson (1999, 386) 
Other Parts of Ancient Greece
Although ancient Greece had more than 1000 city-states, few left records sufficiently detailed to test the predictions of the model. This section will discuss several that did: Argos, Corinth, and Thebes, which were three of the most important city-states after Athens and Sparta. It will also consider Thessaly, the region of Greece that had the largest and most fertile plains.
Argos
Argos provides an interesting test of the model because while it, like Sparta, was settled by Dorian invaders in the 10 th century, its terrain is much more like that of Athens. 47 The Argive plain was substantially smaller than those controlled by Sparta (see table 1), and, although fertile, was one of the most drought-ridden in mainland Greece. 48 Hence, compared to Sparta, Argos had a smaller r.
The model would therefore predict a broader distribution of democratic rights than in Sparta, and 46 It is interesting to speculate on why Alexander the Great and the subsequent Roman conquerors did not maintain democracy. The pattern of events is consistent with model=s basic predictions. First, both empires, if viewed as a whole, had relatively high values of r because they held vast areas of fertile plains. Second, once under imperial control, the likelihood of a foreign conquest that threatened residents= wealth (in the sense of the model) would have been small, especially for Greek cities. This suggests a low value of γ. As the model predicts, a high value of r and a low value of γ yield weak incentives for leaders to establish widespread democracy. 47 Kelly (1976, 3) writes of Argos, ALike most of Greece this area is made up largely of barren limestone hills and mountains.@ 48 Homer, for example, referred to Athirsty Argos.@ that is exactly what one sees. Robinson (1997, 82) Freeman (1999, 188) writes:
[T]he southern Argoloid became virtually deserted in the Dark Age and it was not until the 8 th century that there was renewed settlement along the valleys. At first only grain was produced but population growth in the following centuries went hand and hand with the exploitation of more marginal land, often steep and stony, and less able to retain moisture. Here olives were grown, with possibly some grain among their roots. This was a significant step. Olives take years to mature and require capital, equipment, oil presses and jars, with 49 While it failed to follow Athens= in extending political rights to the landless, Argos distributed rights quite broadly by the standards of the time. Tomlinson (1972, 193) writes, Athe Argive constitution was that of a moderate rather than an extreme democracy, of the sort that existed in Athens before the reform of 462 B.C.@ which to process and store.
And by the Classical Period, Argos was close to Athens in its level of democracy.
Thebes
In contrast to Athens and Argos, Thebes had fertile cereal-producing plains, though not as large as Sparta=s (see table 1) . 51 This made r higher in Thebes than in Athens or Argos, yet lower than in Sparta. Consequently, the model would predict a distribution of political rights narrower than in Athens and Argos, yet broader than in Sparta. And indeed, this was so. Ancient scholars classified
Thebes as an oligarchy. 52 Modern scholars have only a sketchy knowledge of the Theban constitution, but it appears that the most important governing duties were handled by four overlapping councils, each of which had to approve an action before it could be taken. Scholars believe that Thebes probably had a popular assembly, too, but with limited powers and most likely property qualifications (Demand 1982, 26) . Membership on the councils was even more restricted.
But consistent with the model=s predictions, these restrictions were nowhere near as severe as in Sparta, where the entire agricultural workforce was excluded from participation.
Corinth
Because Corinth had a proverbially fertile, though small, central plain, r was higher than in Athens or Argos, but not as high as in Sparta (which had much larger plains; see table 1). 53 The 51 Thebes was located in the center of an agriculturally-rich part of Greece called Boeotia. Theban farmers produced primarily cereals, rather than olives, and Thebes is believed to have been self-sufficient in food production. Boeotian agricultural production was so successful, and the peoples of Boeotia so widelyknown for being well fed, that the insult ABoeotian pig@ became common (Demand 1982, 10 Salmon (1984, 1) writes, Athe fertility of the central region of Corinthia can only be appreciated after closer inspection. The rich land between Corinth and Sicyon was proverbial; and Corinth was >wealthy= to the epic poets before her wealth could have depended to a significant degree on commerce.@ Although Corinth did not receive much rain (on the mainland, only Athens received less), an abundance of natural springs more model therefore predicts a distribution of political rights less broad than in Athens or Argos, but more broad than in Sparta. 54 And this was the case. The ancient authors classified Corinth among the oligarchies. 55 Modern scholars do not know whether Corinth imposed property (or other) requirements for officeholding, or how Corinth divided responsibilities and power among political offices. 56 It is clear, however, that Corinth distributed its political rights more broadly than Sparta:
Corinth had no serfs, and the citizens who worked the land could at least sit in the assembly.
Thessaly
Thessaly is an interesting case because it possessed both a terrain and a government markedly different from the rest of Greece. Thessaly consists mostly of flat, fertile plains, totaling 2400 square miles and ideal for cereal production (Westlake 1969, 2) . Thus, to an even greater degree than Sparta, Thessaly had a high r and low i. During the Classical period, Thessaly exported grain, and grew very few olives (Westlake 1969, 5) . Consistent with the model=s predictions, Thessaly was than made up for it (Salmon 1984, 8; Engels 1990, 12) . Because of the plain=s small size, Corinth also depended on less desirable, hilly agricultural land, and the evidence suggests that Corinthian farmers cultivated olive and fruit trees on this land (Salmon 1984) . 54 Corinth, like Sparta and Argos, was settled by Dorians. 55 For example, Plutarch wrote, ACorinth was more oligarchically governed and dealt with little public business in the assembly@ (Dion 53.2-4). In addition to the council and assembly typical of democracies, Corinth had a third body characteristic of oligarchies, the probouloi, or preliminary council, which set the agenda for the assembly. Aristotle wrote of oligarchies, AIt is right either to co-opt some men from the people (to the deliberative body) or to institute an office like that which some states call nomophylaces and others probouloi [preliminary council], and to allow discussion (by the people in general) only on those matters which these men have considered in advance. For in these ways the demos will participate in deliberation, but will not be able to subvert any part of the constitution@ (Pol. 1298).
56 Salmon (1984, 238) reviews the evidence and concludes that there were probably no property requirements for serving in the assembly, but that the assembly most likely played only a minor role in establishing policy, serving primarily in a consultative capacity.
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57 Although Corinth distributed political rights less broadly than democratic Athens and Argos and more broadly than Sparta, there is insufficient evidence to determine whether Corinth was more or less democratic than Thebes. Thebes=s assembly most likely exercised greater power than did Corinth=s, but probably had stricter property requirements. not democratic. Indeed, Thessaly lacked even rudimentary democratic institutionsCthe polis, as the Greeks understood it, never developed in Thessaly (Hanson 1999, 108, 384; Westlake 1969, 20) .
Through the Classical period, Thessalian rulers remained a collection of barons in the Dark-Age style, with serfs farming the land (Westlake 1969, 27-29) . In sum, Thessaly was less democratic than anywhere else in ancient Greece, consistent with its extremely high value of r and low value of i.
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Summary Table 1 summarizes the relevant facts for the six states discussed in this paper. The states are listed in order of how democratic ancient scholars considered them to be (column 2), a ranking consistent with the conclusions of modern scholars (column 4). Columns 5 and 6 list the size and characteristics of each state=s principal agricultural plains. The parts of Greece with the largest plains, Thessaly and Sparta, did not develop highly democratic systems, while Athens and Argos, the most democratic, had much smaller, drier plains. Thebes and Corinth, with small but relatively rich plains, rank in the middle in terms of democracy. The reader should remember, however, that although these are the city-states about which classical scholars know the most, only scant information is available about some of their political systems. The population figures are also uncertain.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the preceding evidence clearly demonstrates that wealth per se did not lead to democracy. Thebes, with its rich agricultural land in the heart of fertile Boeotia, 58 Wood (1988, 83) writes, AThere were those Greek states which never saw the full development of either the peasant-citizen or large-scale chattel slavery, notably Sparta, Thessaly, and the city-states of Crete. In all these cases, agriculture and production in general were dominated by people who were politically subject to or juridically dependent upon privileged classes or a central authority to whom they were obliged to render tribute and/or labor services in one form or another.@ Hanson (1999, 385-6) writes, AIn Thessaly . . . the old Dark-Age regime of aristocratic horse owners and dependent serfs was never quite dethroned.@ was an oligarchy. And although widely referred to as AWealthy Corinth@ (Salmon 1984) , Corinth was an oligarchy, too.
Commitment to Political Rights: Defense Spending and Warfare
Scholars have long seen a link between the ancient Greek style of warfare, which was based on the hoplite phalanx, and the expansion of political rights. 59 The nature of Greek warfare has important implications for the application of this paper=s model. For the model to explain the adoption of democracy, two things must hold: (i) the aristocrat=s decision to enfranchise the demos must be irrevocable, and (ii) the enfranchised demos must find it in its own interest to devote substantial resources to defense (otherwise the aristocrat will not let the demos set policy). In the case of ancient Greece, both were true, in large part because of hoplite warfare.
First, consider the aristocracy=s ability to grant irrevocable political rights to the demos. In ancient Greece, members of the hoplite phalanx owned their own arms and differed little with respect to their skills in using them. 60 Scholars have noted in other contexts the importance of broadly distributed arms to the securing of rights (Umbeck 1981 , Barzel 2000 . Throughout the Greek city-states, the distribution of arms and the distribution of political rights were closely linked;
for example, one of the early requirements for citizenship in Athens was sufficient wealth to 59 For example, Aristotle (Pol. 4.1297b16-24, 28) viewed the advent of hoplite warfare as an important factor in the development of Greek democracy.
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Hoplite infantrymen were arranged in a tightly grouped phalanx, with each holding a short thrusting spear in his right hand and a shield on his left shoulder (the word Ahoplite@ comes from hoplon, another name for shield); the enormous shield sheltered both his own left side and his companion=s right. Opposing phalanxes assembled on open plains and charged each other. Xenophon says of the crowded and chaotic hoplite clashes, AThere is little chance of missing a blow@ . Accordingly, the citizen-soldiers required little training or skill, and the officers= roles were correspondingly simple. See Hanson (1983) . Xenophon wrote that battle strategy Aconsists primarily of the correct way to march out in formation, the proper manner of posting sentries, and the best approach to crossing a pass@ . Only the Spartans engaged in formal military training, and even among them, success in battle appears to have depended less on tactics and ability with weapons than on discipline in maintaining the phalanx; once on the battlefield, Spartans fought like other Greeks (Hanson 1999, 272) . purchase hoplite arms. 61 As a result, citizens had the means (weapons and skill) to protect their rights. In practice, political rights in Athens remained quite secure (until, of course, a massive foreign invasion from Macedon).
Second, consider the real-life counterpart to the demos= choice of defense spending (g in the model). In practice, defense requires capital, labor, and risk of death, and Greek citizens bore the cost of providing each of these in a manner that corresponded to a remarkably uniform value of g per citizen.
62 With citizen-soldiers paying for and participating in hoplite warfare, and holding substantial wealth that could be lost in foreign attack, the electorate had incentives to choose collectively to provide substantial resources for defense (g*)Ca necessary condition in the model for the aristocracy to support expanding the franchise.
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IV. Potential Extensions
The experience of the ancient Greek city-states has parallels in Western Europe. First, frequent 61 This was the wealth that defined Solon=s third census class, the zeugitaiCsee Appendix B. The basic components of Classical Greek infantry armor were 1) a double-grip, concave round shield; 2) a ACorinthian@ helmet that covered the entire face and head; 3) a Abell@ corsolet of solid bronze; 4) pliable, laceless greaves for knees and shin; 5) a spear with an iron head and a sharp bronze spike on its butt; 6) a short, secondary sword (Hanson 1999, 222) . It is estimated that the hoplite equipment cost about 100 drachma, roughly the price of an agricultural slave (Hanson 1999, 242) . 62 The citizen soldiers in the hoplite armies of most city-states supplied their own equipment. Sparta was the exception, with the government providing the military equipment, paid for by what were essentially tax contributions from citizens. Only in the late 5 th and 4 th centuries did other city-states begin to contribute to the cost of weapons, and even then, only under unusual circumstancesCthe repair of weapons while on the march, gifts to orphaned offspring, training arms for new recruits (Hanson 1999, 290) . 63 Warfare among Greek city-states was frequent, and agricultural investments were susceptible to conquest or destruction. For example, Hanson (1983, 3-4) writes, AFor nearly 300 years war in Greece was shaped by a struggle to destroy, or to protect, grain, vines, and olive trees. Most armies of invasion uniformly entered the level ground of their enemy, and either threatened, or began, to ravage their cropland. To save their farms, defenders felt they were obliged either to capitulate and thereby submit to terms, or to engage in pitched battle and thereby drive the invader away.@ In the context of the model, this implies a substantial value of γ, which (unless so high as to prevent investment) is a democracy-promoting factor. warfare among European countries from the Middle Ages onward gave monarchs the incentive to relinquish power to their subjects in order to encourage the creation of wealth, generating a number of interesting commitment devices (North and Weingast 1989; Kiser and Barzel 1991; Weingast 1997; Barzel 2000) . Second, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (forthcoming) show that in regions where Europeans established colonies or otherwise intervened, physical geography had a strong effect on the institutions established and, consequently, on subsequent economic growth. The authors conclude that institutions that better protected private property rights were established in colonies with few easily exploited natural resources and, thus, few opportunities for simple wealth transfers to Europe. This corresponds, in the context to the model, to low values of r.
Another extension would be an empirical analysis of modern day relationships between income and democracy. The model predicts that exogenous income-raising factors may increase or decrease the incentives for rulers to adopt democracy, depending on the source of the income. For example, an increase in r will increase national income, yet decrease the ruler=s incentive to adopt democracy.
This suggests that wealthy non-democratic countries will typically have high values of r, which may explain, for example, the persistence of oil-rich Middle Eastern monarchies, where specific investment in oil production is easily monitored. Finally, the model has application to the question of what foreign policies encourage democracy.
For example, Harry Wu, one of the most prominent proponents of democracy in China, argues that foreign investment and freer trade have increased living standards for many Chinese (as most economists would expect), but nevertheless have delayed the adoption of democracy. 64 Wu=s 33 64 Wu (2000, 1) writes, AIt is true that living conditions for many Chinese have improved thanks to millions of dollars of foreign investment. But it is the Chinese government that benefits most from foreign trade and investment. The government needs foreign money and technology to maintain and increase its power and to modernize their system of tyranny.@ Wu goes on to discuss how the Chinese government is using these funds to purchase weaponry, which is also consistent with the model. argument, which obviously contradicts the simple Awealth causes democracy@ hypothesis, fits the theoretical framework of this paper. By increasing the reservation wage w, foreign investment and freer trade will increase workers= living standards. 65 That alone would promote democracy.
However, foreign investment and freer trade may also increase r and, hence, the returns to the rulers in the absence of granting political rights. If the effect of the increase in r dominates the effect of the increase in w, then the adoption of democracy will be retarded. 66 This fits Wu=s (2000, 2) observation that AWe have seen the >dollars to democracy= theory fail over the past twenty years.@
V. Conclusion
By developing a model and applying it to the rise and fall of democracy in ancient Greece, this paper contributes to a literature that dates back to the scholarly work of the ancient Greeks themselves. The theory and evidence suggest that democratic institutions tend to expand when they can mitigate important time-inconsistency problems and, therefore, encourage investment.
Consequently, exogenous factors, most notably the potential returns to costly-to-monitor specific investments, can influence both the adoption of democracy and economic performance. The paper thus illuminates an interesting and important issue for the emerging literature on the links between democracy and economic growth.
At the end of the Dark Ages, when the first Greek city-states appeared, aristocratic governments ruled throughout Greece. Over the centuries that followed, city-states varied with respect to how far they extended democratic political rights. Athens is well-known as the most democratic of the citystates. Why did Athens become so democratic? By granting voting rights to those who actually worked the land, democracy improved farmers= incentives to make long-term specific investments, because it reduced the likelihood that the fruits of that investment would be expropriated. And because these investments were so important in Athens, democracy contributed sufficiently to wealth-generation that the aristocracy found the expansion of democratic rights to be in its interest.
In contrast to Athens, Sparta is famous for a militarily-focused, aristocratic government that lasted through the Classical period. Why did Sparta not follow Athens in becoming democratic?
The reason is that providing those who worked the land with secure rights to residual claims mattered less in Sparta, because the aristocracy could more easily observe the level of investment and effort by those who worked the fields. Consequently, the Spartan elite had little incentive to grant voting rights to the agricultural sector, which in turn kept the franchise limited. Thus, in contrast to Athens, where landowning farmers became the majority of the citizenry, those who worked the land in Sparta remained serfs, as they had been centuries earlier throughout Greece.
The same mechanism explains the rise and fall of democracy in Athens over time. From a relatively undemocratic starting point at the end of the Dark Ages, Athenian political institutions became increasingly democratic as two factorsCthe settlement of vacant land and a change in olive production technologyCraised the returns to specific investments. The rise of democracy was accompanied by the establishment of family farms, worked by enfranchised citizen-farmers who made large specific investments in olive production. Athenian democracy ended with the invasions of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, after which the small family farms disappeared and olive production collapsed.
Investigating other parts of ancient Greece provides additional evidence consistent with the model=s predictions. Governments in areas with large fertile plains (e.g., Thessaly, Sparta, and, to a lesser extent, Corinth and Thebes), where the additional output generated by costly-to-observe specific investment would have been low, tended to be more aristocratic. Governments in heterogeneous hilly areas (e.g., Athens and Argos), where the additional output generated by costlyto-observe specific investment was high, tended to be more democratic.
This paper thus concludes that democracy among the city-states of ancient Greece arose and endured, at least in part, because it promoted specific investment. The same mechanism should apply in a variety of other settings. The general prediction is that countries with wealth based on assets requiring little in the way of costly-to-monitor specific investment have weaker incentives to establish democracy. In other words, yesterday=s grain fields of Sparta may be today=s oil wells of the Middle East.
Appendix A: A Simple Extension of the Model
A useful extension of the model is to allow a succession of aristocrats, with heterogeneity among aristocrats= objective functions. Consider adding the following assumption:
A3'
Aristocratic preferences. The aristocrat=s per period value of avoiding conquest is m + m a when the aristocrat controls tax rates, and m when the demos controls tax rates. The aristocrat is drawn from two types, so that m a = m a high with probability q, and m a = m a low with probability 1-q, where m a low < m a high . If conquered, the country returns to the initial state of the model with a new randomly drawn aristocrat.
The value of m a may reflect personal tastes for aristocratic control and/or the additional value of perks attached to being an aristocrat when the aristocrat controls tax rates. In the case where policy has more than one dimension, m a can represent the effect that the choice of government type has on other aspects of policy (e.g., redistribution away from the aristocracy).
The key question is how the probability of a regime type in a given period depends on the exogenous variables. Case i now has the following value to the aristocrat:
Naturally, for any given aristocrat, a high value of m a will increase the aristocrat=s expected value of retaining control of tax rates. Thus, given the two potential types of aristocrats, three possible cases exist: both types choose democracy (m a high sufficiently low); neither type chooses democracy (m a low sufficiently high); the type with m a low chooses democracy and the type with m a high does not choose democracy. The following discussion considers the last case (the interesting one). Now the choice of government type is a Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities between democratic and aristocratic control of tax rates:
Therefore, the steady state probability of democratic control of tax rates is:
For interior solutions, differentiating π with respect to the exogenous variables yields (proof available from the authors):
These results yield predictions P1-P4 (see section II of this paper).
(i.e., not in the general interest) assembly decisions by simply declaring the assembly adjourned.
71
Although the Gerousia=s members were probably chosen only from certain important families, they were elected by the popular assembly, in which all Spartan citizens could participate. 72 The assembly also possessed the power to pass laws, as well as the right to elect the five ephors (overseers), citizens over the age of 30 who were responsible for supervising the kings and presiding over the assembly.
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Spartan political institutions then changed very little over the next three hundred years. 74 Thus, when compared with most other Greek city-states, the Dark-Age roots of Classical Sparta remained remarkably clear: a warriors= assembly overseen by a council, with military and religious duties performed by a king.
Athens
The political institutions of 8 th century Athens, like those of 8 th century Sparta, consisted of king, aristocratic council, and warriors= assembly. According to tradition, the last Athenian king was replaced around 700 B.C. by a hereditary elite, the Eupatridai (Athose born of noble fathers@), who selected archons (Aleaders@) from among their ranks to fill various administrative and judicial posts. Only members of the Eupatridai could hold public office. Classical scholars believe that Athens also had an assembly, probably, as in Sparta of the time, consisting of the heavily-armed warriors.
75
The first major democratic reforms in Athens were brought about in the early 6 th century by the famous archon Solon.
76 Solon changed the Athenian political system from one based primarily on 71 See Forrest (1968, 46, 49-50) for a discussion the Gerousia and of the clause which granted this right. It is unclear under exactly what circumstances the power would be invoked. The Gerousia also served as a criminal trial court for charges of murder, treason, and other serious crimes. 72 Candidates would appear before the assembly in an order determined by lot, with the assembly=s choice made by acclamation (the winning candidate receiving the loudest shouts). 73 Sparta most likely established the office of ephor circa 700 B.C. (Forrest 1968, 77) . Ephors, who took a monthly oath to support a king as long as the king behaved lawfully, had the power to impeach and depose kings judged derelict in their duties (an ephor once even ordered a king to divorce his queen so as to begat male heirs; see Freeman 1999, 96) . Two ephors always accompanied a king on military campaigns. The ephors also performed judicial functions in civic matters, dealt with foreign embassies, and directed the education of the young. Several procedures limited the accumulation of power by a sitting ephor: ephors served for a single year, could not be re-elected, and could be audited and punished by successors in office.
74 Forrest (1968, 64) Ober (1989, 57) writes of the Athens of this period, AIt appears that Eupatridai effectively dominated the major magistracies and hence that the government was largely or entirely controlled by the nobility.@ Athens ultimately established a system of nine archons: a head official (Athe archon@) from whose name the name of the year would be taken, a war leader (the polemarchos), a Aking@ (the basileus) who performed religious ceremonies requiring royal participation, and six officials (the thesmothetai) with legal responsibilities.
39
76 Scholars know little about Solon beyond the fact that he became archon in 594. Some of the acts status at birth to one based on wealth, thus enfranchising much of the agrarian sector. He did this by creating four new census classes defined by agricultural output (as a measure of property holdings): the pentekosiomediomnoi (500 measure men), the hippeis (300 measure men), the zeugitai (200 measure men), and the thetes (less than 200 measures). 77 All four classes had the right to sit on the popular assembly (which remained largely for ratifying the decisions of the archons); the thetes lacked the right to speak in the assembly (Ober 1989, 64) . Also newly created was the ACouncil of 400,@ in which only members of the three highest census classes could serve. The Council=s main task was to prepare motions for the assembly (O=Neil 1995, 18) . Members of the two highest census classes could become archons, the major administrative and judicial decision makers, through election by the assembly (Ober 1989, 61) . After serving their terms, former archons became members of the Areopagus, a body given general oversight of the laws of the state. 78 Because of these reforms, AAn elite of wealth, which would be larger and more permeable to new members, replaced the nobility of birth as the exclusive governing elite@ (Ober 1989, 61 ).
79
The second major expansion of democracy occurred in 508 B.C., when Cleisthenes reorganized the system of representation. The new system required all Athenians to register at a local deme.
80
Each of the 139 demes then sent representatives (the number of which depended on the population of the deme) to serve on the newly-formed Council of 500, which replaced Solon=s Council of 400. As with the old council, the Council of 500=s primary responsibility was to prepare the agenda for the assembly. However, unlike the Council of 400, eligibility criteria for serving on the council of 500 did not include property requirements.
Over the following decades, a series of reforms further weakened the links between property holding and public office. In 487, a lottery replaced election as the means for choosing the still very powerful archons. Athenians considered lots more democratic than electionsCas Aristotle pointed out, elections favored those with wealth (Ober 1989, 7) . 81 In 462, an Athenian named Ephialtes led a movement that eliminated the power of the Areopagus to review and set aside decisions of the assembly; the reform left the more broadly representative Council of 500 as the only major advisory body to the assembly. Several years later, the right of all to speak on state matters at the popular traditionally credited to Solon may not have been his. 77 Modern estimates suggest that members of the pentekosiomediomnoi needed thirty or more acres of land, the hippeis needed 18 or more, and the zeugitai needed 12 or more. See Murray (1983, 194) . 78 Scholars know little about the origins of the Areopagus. Manville (1990, 74) writes, AAs the preeminent conciliar authority during the Archaic age, it may have developed out of the informal advisory bodies of nobles who served the early kings.@ 79 Solon also eliminated debt bondage in a reform known as the seisachtheia, or shaking off of burdens, and established a process for citizens to appeal the rulings of magistrates, perhaps through a special court or the assembly. This appeals process furthered the transfer of rights to the non-nobility. 80 A deme was typically a township or community. The assignment of individuals to a deme was not strictly geographical, as a citizen remained a member of the same deme even if he moved. 81 By the Classical period, the only elective post remaining in Athens was that of military general (Freeman 1999, 230) . assembly became law. Previously, propertyless thetes could only listen and ratify. In 457/6 all offices, including archonships, were opened to the third census class, the zeugitai, and by the 4 th century they were open to the landless thetes as well. Ober (1989, 81-2) concludes, ABy the 440s, if not before, demokratia became the standard term to describe the Athenian form of government, and the demos indeed possessed the political power in the state.@ Remarkably, any male born of a citizen father and Athenian mother had the same political rights as any other male citizen.
